But although Labour was under pressure to make its mark, the economic situation was precarious. The current account deficit reached £327m or 1 per cent of GDP in 1964 and financial markets were concerned that a profligate Labour administration would make things worse.

Mr Callaghan’s first Budget of November 1964 did nothing to allay these fears.

The Wilson government had already promised a generous increase in old age pensions and pledged to abolish health service charges. In order to pay for this, Mr Callaghan raised the standard rate of income tax from 38.75 to 41.25 per cent. Petrol duty was also increased.

Although the government argued that the measures would be neutral – with pension increases offset by higher taxes – the Budget appears to have boosted consumer demand. Financial markets saw the Budget as a sign that Labour was not serious about maintaining the current level of sterling.

The pound was eventually devalued on November 18 1967.

After six years of opposition, Mr Barber was keen to give the Tory ranks something to cheer about.

His first Budget satisfied the full gamut of backbench demands and was greeted with a rapturous standing ovation.

The objective, he said, was to lessen government interference, reduce government subsidies and “break into a new period of faster growth”.

The income tax rise of Mr Callaghan’s first Budget was reversed taking the basic rate down from 41.25 to 38.75 per cent. Selective employment tax rates were halved and corporation tax was reduced from 42.5 to 40 per cent.

The 1971 Budget inaugurated a period of aggressive economic reflation, which culminated in the notorious “Barber boom”. But by 1973 the budget deficit was being forecast at £4,423m an enormous figure at the time. Scepticism in financial markets over the chancellor’s strategy had also pushed the pound sharply lower, fuelling inflation.

Geoffrey Howe’s first Budget came hot on the heels of the Mrs Thatcher’s election victory in May.

Although Mrs Thatcher had pledged to reduce income tax, few were prepared for the radicalism of this Budget. The basic rate of income tax was cut from 33 to 30 per cent and the highest rate was cut from 83 to 60 per cent. To compensate, VAT was raised to 15 per cent – replacing a basic rate of 8 per cent and a 12.5 per cent rate for luxury goods. The chancellor also announced cuts of £4bn in public spending.

The Budget marked the start of a shift from direct to indirect tax, a policy which hit the poor and gave money to the rich. It was also the first real indication that Mrs Thatcher would break with the postwar consensus and with One Nation Conservatism.

The most visible economic consequence was the spike up in inflation to a peak of 21.9 per cent in 1980 following the rise in VAT.

Inflation had fallen back to around 5 per cent by 1982, however, as Britain entered its most severe recession since the second world war.

Nigel Lawson’s fifth Budget followed the Conservative’s crushing defeat of Labour in the general election of June 11, 1987.

By 1998 many policy makers had become convinced that Britain was enjoying an “economic miracle”. Public finances were extremely healthy and the budget surplus was expected to rise to 3 per of GDP.

This combination gave Mr Lawson the confidence to enact another round of tax cuts. As well as reducing the basic rate of income tax from 27 to 25 per cent, Mr Lawson abolished all rates of income tax over 40 per cent. The inheritance tax threshold was raised from £90,000 to £110,000 and a single rate of 40 per cent replaced the existing four rates between 30 and 60 per cent.

Again the measures redistributed money to higher income brackets. As the extent of the tax cuts became clear, city dealers cheered and Labour MP’s began to chant “shame!” at the chancellor.

Accusations that the Tories were stealing from the poor to give to the rich were intensified by Norman Fowler’s social security reforms of April 1998 in which some benefits were cut.

By 1993 tax cuts from the 1988 Budget coupled with big increases in public spending had taken their toll on public finances.

Expectations of a budget surplus of 3 per cent of GDP had given way to forecasts of a 7 per cent deficit.

Norman Lamont managed to postpone the inevitable until after the general election of April 1992. But tax rises were essential to prevent the deficit spiralling out of control.

The rise in taxation announced in 1993 was the largest of any postwar Budget as a proportion of national income.

Employee National Insurance contributions increased by 1 percentage point to 10 per cent. VAT was extended to fuel at a rate of 8 per cent from April 1994 and at 17.5 per cent from April 1995. As part of a reform of corportation tax, the value of the dividend tax credit paid to non tax payers including pension funds was cut to 20 per cent.

1993 was seen by many as the prototypical stealth Budget. It was not until later that the true extent of tax rises became apparent. This was partly because many of the increases were delayed until 1994 and 1995.

In his first Budget after Labour’s election victory in May Mr Brown sought to establish his party’s reputation for prudent fiscal management and avoid the mistakes of the Wilson years. Mr Brown’s increase in taxes in this Budget provided a useful buffer for the rest of the parliament.

The headlines were grabbed by the windfall tax on privatised utilities, which raised a one-off sum of £5bn. Mr Brown also introduced large increases in fuel duties.

More important, however, was the abolition of dividend tax credit in corporation tax for pension funds. This raised over £5bn a year, a measure only partly offset by a cut in corporation tax intended to save businesses £2bn a year.

At the time pension funds had big surpluses and the abolition of dividend tax credit looked as though it would be easy to bear. Now many see the abolition as being partly responsible for the decline of many defined benefit pension schemes.

Although the Budget helped to erase the memory of previous spendthrift Labour governments, it also gained Mr Brown a reputation for stealth rather than transparency.