This article appears in Friday's Financial Times' survey - 2002 and Beyond - the survey exploring the World Economic Forum agenda.

After September 11, the world appeared to be witnessing a geopolitical realignment comparable to events after the Second World War.

One-time adversaries such as China and Russia became new-found US allies in President George W. Bush's declared war on terrorism. Pakistan abandoned its client Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Front-line states such as Iran remained neutral or, in the case of Tadjikistan and Uzbekhistan, actively helpful to the US cause.

The second Afghan war is now over. The Taliban and the al-Qaeda terror network have been routed by US airpower, Soviet-era tanks and cavalry led by the Northern Alliance. The question is whether this marks a lasting realignment or a lengthy confrontation between a prosperous democratic west and Islamic extremists.

The first lesson is that the revolution in US military affairs continues apace. This was a war directed from Tampa, Florida, thousands of miles from the front-line. It was fought with unmanned, satellite-controlled predator aircraft and small "packets" of soldiers rather than massed troops and tanks, as in the Gulf war a decade ago.

This awesome display of US military power has encouraged the Bush administration to abandon any lingering doubts about the wisdom of widening its campaign beyond Afghanistan.

"We're interested in a lot more than al-Qaeda," said Donald Rumsfeld, US defence secretary. "If we have to go into 15 or more countries we ought to do it, to deal with the problems of terrorism so that we don't allow this problem to damage and kill tens of thousands more people."

In the Philippines, where al-Qaeda is thought to have set up jungle bases, the US military role will be restricted to training the regular Philippine army. But in failed states such as Somalia it is possible that lightning strikes or covert operations will take place.

The US may also consolidate its temporary bases in central Asia. US forces would gain a launch-pad in the region. But the move could stoke tensions in Pakistan and Uzbekhistan, repeating resentment against the US presence in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War.

One unexpected bonus is that the Russians appear more relaxed about the US presence in central Asia compared to last September when President Vladimir Putin's pro-American tilt was by no means a foregone conclusion. Moscow seems to have calculated the US bases could strengthen its southern flank against Islamic fundamentalism.

Mr Putin supported Mr Bush's war against terror because it gives him an effective free hand to smash rebels in the breakaway republic of Chechnya - a similar calculation to Beijing's desire to clamp down in western China. But Mr Putin is also determined to salvage what is left of Russia's great power status.

Russia's long-term ambition is to transform the US-led military alliance into a broader political club embracing east and west. Nato's invocation of the Article 5 mutual defence clause and its invisible military role in Afghanistan could accelerate the trend.

For the US has already signalled that it has no intention of waging future wars by Nato committee. It also wants the Europeans to carry out peacekeeping duties in the Balkans.

Russia will still pay a price. Mr Bush signalled late last year that the US would unilaterally abandon the 1972 ABM treaty in favour of developing its own missile defence system.

This year, the administration revised its earlier offer to make deep unilateral cuts in its offensive nuclear missile arsenal and announced that it intended to keep some missiles in storage rather than rendering them beyond use.

America's unilateralist "itch" is as strong as ever.

Iraq is almost certainly next in line. But, so far, officials have yet to come up with a plan that meets "the Afghan test": a low-cost, speedy assault that has a high probability of toppling President Saddam Hussein.

The administration believes that the majority of Gulf states and European countries want Mr Saddam out of power but none has the stomach for a protracted campaign. That is why policymakers are working on two premises: that the US should turn up pressure on Baghdad without making demands on Mr Saddam that he might meet, and a clear view that the post-Saddam regime must not lead to the partition of Iraq.

Washington's calculation is that a break-up of Iraq would fundamentally alter the balance of power in the Middle East, especially if it led to the creation of an independent Kurdistan. Turkey, a steadfast US ally with a large Kurd minority, would be destabilised. Iran could exploit the vacuum.

Another scenario is a grand bargain whereby the US would agree to withdraw its troops from Saudi Arabia in return for a change of regime in Baghdad. Russia, still owed billions by the Iraqi regime, could play a constructive role.

A shift of US military presence to central Asia, where there are significant oil and gas deposits, would fit the picture of reducing US dependency on the Gulf.

The permanent US presence in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf war handed the al-Qaeda leaders a potent weapon in their drive to recruit a global network of operatives capable of attacking the US. A US withdrawal would remove an excuse which extremist Islamic groups such as al-Qaeda have used to target the west; but it should not turn into a retreat on the lines of Lebanon in 1983.

The US does not see its war on terrorism as part of a wider struggle against Islamic fundamentalism. Nor do European countries, many of which have large minority Muslim populations.

Bernard Lewis, the eminent historian, wrote in the Atlantic Monthly that a resolution of the conflict will depend largely on the populations of the Muslim world.

"If the peoples of the Middle East continue on their present path, the suicide bomber will become a metaphor for the whole region, and there will be no escape from a downward spiral of hate and spite, rage and self-pity, poverty and oppression..."

But if they can abandon grievance and victimhood, settle their differences and join together in a common creative endeavour, then the Middle East could once again become a major centre of civilisation.

Lionel Barber answers your questions on geopolitical issues during the World Economic Forum - follow this link.